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The practice of third-party funding (TPF) of investment arbitration is the subject of heated debate. 
Proponents argue that TPF increases “access to justice” in the form of investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS). Detractors worry, among other things, about the increase in (frivolous or marginal) 
claims. What much of the current debate lacks is an empirical analysis of the factors driving the 
development of this practice and shaping its outcomes. Examining what has contributed to the rise of 
TPF allows us better to understand how it affects arbitration and how it may develop in the future.  
 
What explains the rise of TPF in investment arbitration? One necessary, if not sufficient, condition is 
the legality of the practice in certain domestic jurisdictions that are important centers of international 
arbitration. Historically, common law systems prohibited the funding of legal claims by third parties, 
but legal changes in the UK eased these restrictions.1 This was necessary for the growth of the 
industry, and its spread to other jurisdictions, including the US, Hong Kong (China) and Singapore. 
While some of these changes centered on the legality of funding domestic claims, they also ensure 
the enforceability of contracts and awards associated with ISDS, which funders told us gives them 
greater confidence when funding treaty and contract claims. However, these changes alone do not 
explain the rapid growth and development of the industry.  
 
Proponents claim that TPF’s emergence can be explained as a response to a widely recognized 
problem¬: the high costs of arbitration. TPF is thus framed as a way to increase “access to justice” 
for claimants, including by the UK’s Ministry of Justice in 2009. However, in practice, funders of 
ISDS claims actively and successfully promote TPF to non-financially distressed claimants, and one 
funder told us “I don’t think any funder is in the business of providing access to justice.”   
 
With the rise of TPF, investment arbitration has gone through a process of “financialization,” 
referring to the increasing role of financial markets, actors and institutions in domestic and 
international economies. TPF thus reflects broader trends toward a finance-led economic growth 
regime that has increased the amount of capital that institutional investors such as pension funds and 
insurance companies and their asset managers control, hold and seek to deploy. TPF became an 
attractive investment outlet because it yields high returns and is an uncorrelated asset class. As a 
result, money has poured into the TPF industry, which has now billions of dollars available to it.  
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Our interviews suggest that this “financialization” of investment arbitration has several observable 
indicators, including: 
 
 A growing acceptance and more frequent consideration of TPF by arbitration lawyers, despite 
initial distrust and concerns about the legality of the practice.  
 An institutionalization of relationships between law firms and funders. As one funder 
described it, firms are “linking up with funders and becoming a partner.” 
 An alignment of the interests of law firms whose clients need funding and financial actors 
who feel pressured to deploy capital.  
 The reliance on financial logics to determine which cases receive funding. As the funders we 
spoke to explained, they routinely rule out funding cases they consider legally meritorious if 
the size of the potential return is too low and if not funded as part of a portfolio of claims.   
 
These findings are relevant for important debates regarding TPF. First, the increasing closeness of 
funders and law firms suggests a need for greater transparency to avoid conflicts of interest, such as 
funders encouraging lawyers not to settle under specific amounts. However, an open question is 
whether, if the TPF industry continues to grow, the pressure to deploy capital will result in an increase 
in less meritorious or more marginal claims funded. Already, a situation has emerged in which 
funders are, in the words of one lawyer, “all fighting for the same cases”—and hence may be tempted 
to settle for marginal claims. 
 
Second, rather than worry about an increase in frivolous claims, as some observers do, we should 
focus on the ways in which funding might skew the system in favor of large investors. As expected, 
returns determine which cases receive funding, smaller investors may not be able to acquire TPF, 
which undermines the access-to-justice narrative of TPF proponents. Of course, TPF also increases 
resources available to investors making use of ISDS while doing nothing to address the concerns of 
states with the system. 
 
TPF has been a focus in the ongoing UNCITRAL meetings on ISDS reform. Along with some states 
involved in this process, we argue that, as a first step, there should be a push for greater transparency 
regarding the use of TPF in ISDS. While this would not address all concerns associated with the 
practice, greater transparency would both reduce potential conflicts of interest and allow researchers, 
states and other interested parties better to understand how TPF affects arbitration proceedings and 
outcomes. 
  
* The Columbia FDI Perspectives are a forum for public debate. The views expressed by the author(s) do not reflect 
the opinions of CCSI or Columbia University or our partners and supporters. Columbia FDI Perspectives (ISSN 
2158-3579) is a peer-reviewed series. 
** Florence Dafe (florence.dafe@hfp.tum.de) is a political economist at the Chair of European and Global Governance of 
the Hochschule für Politik/TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich; Zoe Williams 
(zoephillipsw@gmail.com) is an associate at the International Institute for Sustainable Development and managing editor 
of Investment Treaty News. This Perspective is based on a research project that takes a political economy approach to 
the practice, examining several factors that have facilitated the rise of TPF of investment arbitration. The research relied 
on interviews carried out with 20 funders and lawyers in the US, UK, EU, and Singapore. Interviews provide an invaluable 
source of information about an industry that lacks transparency; the quotes in the Perspective are from these interviews. 
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1 Milestones were, for instance, the 2005 Court of Appeal ruling in Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd. [EWCA] Civ 655, and 
the UK Ministry of Justice’s Justice Rupert Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (2009). 
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